

June 24, 1957

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COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

COPY NO. Z

BY THE NSC PLANNING BOARD

on

DEFENSE MOBILIZATION PLAN

D-MINUS

(Memo for NSC, May 29, 1957)

I. The Planning Board was requested by the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization, to review the following parts of Mobilization Plan D-Minus:

Part I-A - Capability Assumptions - pp. 1-2,

Part I-B - Weapons Effects - pp. 3-27,

Part I-C - Situation Assumptions - The Attack -
pp. 27-30, The Post Attack Analysis -
pp. 30-43,

Part I-D - Policy Assumptions - pp. 44-47,

Part I-E - Definitions - pp. 48-52,

Part III - Actions by the President - pp. 79-90,

in order to make recommendations to the National Security Council as to:

a. The suitability of the assumptions contained therein, under current national security appreciations of the threat to the U. S., for the purposes of defense mobilization planning.

b. The conformity of these parts with existing national security policy approved by the President on recommendation of the National Security Council.

The Planning Board has not examined the other parts of Plan D-Minus.

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II. As to suitability for planning purposes, the Planning Board's comments on these parts are as follows:

1. "Capability Assumptions" (Part I-A, pp. 1-2).

The Planning Board recommends that the Council note that the "Capability Assumptions" are suitable as a basis for defense mobilization planning for a surprise attack on the continental United States, it being understood that the assumptions will be subject to continuous change and review.

2. "Weapons Effects" (Part I-B, pp. 3-26). The

Planning Board recommends that the Council agree that the "Weapons Effects" section, being of a highly technical nature, should be subject to continuing review and appropriate concurrence for technical accuracy by the Atomic Energy Commission, the Department of Defense (AFSWP), the Federal Civil Defense Administration, and the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (Public Health Service), including their medical representatives.

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3. "Situation Assumptions: The Attack" (Part I-C, pp. 27-29). The Planning Board recommends that the Council note that the "Situation Assumptions -- The Attack" are suitable (except as noted below) as a basis for defense mobilization planning for a surprise attack on the continental United States, it being understood that the assumptions will be subject to continuous change and review:

a. With reference to para. 5 of this Part I-C, the Planning Board believes that the assumed range of nuclear weapons to be employed should be from a few kilotons to several megatons.

b. With reference to the tabulation in para. 6 of this Part I-C:

(1) The CIA Adviser believes that a more useful assumption would be a ratio of two or three nuclear radiation casualties to one blast and thermal casualty. The Office of Defense Mobilization will review the ratios in this tabulation with the staff of the NSC Net Evaluation Subcommittee.

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(2) The Budget Member expressed concern as to the validity of the figures shown in the tabulation, because they are not supported by a current net capabilities study related to the particular period of time and assumptions of Plan D-Minus.

c. It should be noted that Plan D-Minus does not assume that the USSR will use its capability to employ biological and chemical agents in an attack.

4. "Situation Assumptions: Post Attack Analysis" (Part I-C, pp. 30-43). The Planning Board recommends that the Council note that the "Situation Assumptions -- Post Attack Analysis" are suitable as a basis for defense mobilization planning for a surprise attack on the continental United States, it being understood that the assumptions will be subject to continuous change and review. The Office of Defense Mobilization will review with the Public Health Service the assumptions as to communicable diseases in para. 15 of this section. (See also the comments under para. 5 below.)

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5. "Policy Assumptions" (Part I-D, pp. 44-47;
"Actions by the President" (Part III, pp. 79-90).

With reference to the "Policy Assumptions" and "Actions by the President":

a. The Planning Board recommends that, with respect to the immediate post-attack period in areas of devastation, these parts:

(1) Should indicate greater emphasis upon the maintenance of law and order among the civil population.

(2) Should indicate a greater degree of reliance on State and local governments.

(3) Should indicate that armed forces available under Part II-B, 7 (p. 60) should assist State and local governments, on their request, particularly in maintaining law and order.

~~Ch. 7 ODM paragraph 7~~

b. The Planning Board notes that "Actions by the President" do not include a document dealing with the use of nuclear weapons by U. S. forces, the transfer of nuclear weapons to U. S. allies, and consultations with U. S. allies as required regarding the use of nuclear weapons from allied bases; and recommends that such a document be prepared by the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission.

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notes the
 d. The Planning Board, noting para. 9 of the "Situation Assumptions" (p. 32), calls attention to the fact that the validity of "Policy Assumption No. 2" (p. 44) is dependent on protection against radioactive fall-out being provided at the relocation sites which are subject to such fall-out.

e. The Planning Board assumes that the "Policy Assumptions" and the "Actions by the President" will be subject to continuous change and review.

6. "Definitions" (Part I-E, pp. 47-52). The Planning Board did not review the definitions and recommends no action thereon by the Council.


III. As to conformity with existing national security policy, the Planning Board finds the parts examined are not in conflict with existing national security policy approved by the President on the recommendation of the National Security Council.

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IV. The Planning Board wishes to add a general comment. The "Policy Assumptions" and "Actions by the President" appear unreal as a response to the catastrophic results of the assumed attack described in Part I. They place emphasis on articulated, detailed planning for a recovery period without seeming to take full account of how the nation will pass through the chaos of the immediate post-attack period. It would seem that as much attention should be given to planning for law and order, survival, and the exercise of any authority during the immediate post-attack period as to the steps which will follow in the recovery period (for example, the creation of and action by War Resources agencies).



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